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Abstract— Current research into highly automated driving
(HAD) functions aims to support drivers in various situations.
These functions are devised to master different scenarios
including traffic participants and environmental conditions. The
challenge in this context is to guarantee a fault free operation
within this indefinite number of scenarios and estimate the risk
of a collision caused by driverless vehicles. Current risk assess-
ment methods are not capable of assessing the performance
of the HAD functions within the scenario space. This lack of
valid assessment methods motivated the setting up of research
partnerships such as the German PEGASUS project in order
to measure the improvement of traffic safety. In this research
we communicate our method for validating the scenario space
using multiple test domains. The first part discusses the re-
quirements towards a scenario description, transferring the test
space into a scenario-depending representation which enables
the comparison of scenarios across test domains. The second
part introduces an evaluation system based on key performance
indices for functional, legislative, and system dependent criteria
regarding the HAD functions thus determining the performance
per scenario. The paper concludes with the proposal of a novel
approach towards how highly automated driving functions can
benefit online from the evaluation process during drive time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid improvement in self-driving vehicle development
is expected to lead to a ready-to-market technology during
the next decade. Remote controlled functions [1] can be
seen as the starting point of driver assistance systems which
evolved towards the exectution of fixed determined motions.
Todays understanding of self-driving vehicles includes the
capability to interact with its environment making intelligent
decisions [2]. Besides technological feasibility, the highest
conceivable form of self-driving is characterized by the
ability of navigating completely without human interaction
also called autonomous or fully automated driving (FAD)
[3]. An intermediate step between FAD and conventional
advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) is given by
highly automated driving (HAD) in which the vehicles
prediction horizon allows a take-over by the human driver
in a reasonable time. Although some highly-developed
ADAS seem already closely related to a HAD function, the
underlying assessment for their release excludes the driver
as last fallback layer. In the case of ADAS, the driver, the
vehicle, and the environment are in the loop, continuously
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interacting with each other. In contrast, HAD systems allow
inattentiveness of the driver concerning traffic awareness.
This difference illustrates the difference between the today’s
assessment methods for ADAS compared to HAD systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. It begins
by giving an overview of the current assessment method
for ADAS and the first approaches for HAD in Section
II. In section III criteria for describing a scenario for a
HAD function are derived and the paper describes how to
evaluate its performance. Afterwards we present an approach
for replacing test domains without consistently evaluating
scenarios. A summary and outlook conclude the paper in
section IV.
II. ASSESSMENT OF ADAS AND HAD
A. Current Methods for the Assessment of ADAS
State-of-the-art assessment of ADAS installs a test concept
before the actual development process [4]. It consists of
a collection of use cases, derived from the requirements
that the system needs to fulfil. Each of the use cases is
proven via field operational tests (FOT) or naturalistic driving
studies (NDS). Both featuring real test domains, which aim to
prove the system effectiveness in real traffic. Afterwards, the
evaluation either confirms the expected behaviour or reveals
functional errors. The results of the use case evaluation are
fed back to specify or generate new use cases. The analysis
of use case generation is in the first place accomplished
by expert knowledge and expanded by experiences gained
during the development process using virtual test domains.
In contrast to FOT or NDS, virtual test domains are charac-
terized by the deployment of models to simulate functions or
components of the vehicle which are not yet available. The
degree of virtualization varies depending on the test domain.
At the beginning of the development process the software
between driver, vehicle and environment is fully simulated by
models, called software-in-the-loop (SIL). With increasing
progress more realistic test domains can be established by
replacing models partially with real components, leading
to a decrease in the degree of virtualization. For example,
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) uses real electronic control units
or vehicle-in-the-loop (VIL) inserts simulated sensor data
into a real vehicle. To date nearly each use case for ADAS
is confirmed by FOT or NDS [5]. For a single ADAS this
process is economically acceptable as the required test miles
are in the one- to two-digit million range [6]. Thus, there
exists no need to determine the accuracy of a virtual test
domains, their purpose is the generation of new use cases.
With increasing complexity and functional scope of
ADAS the number of use cases grew significantly over
the last few years and the focus moved towards limiting
the number of use cases. First approaches tried to improve
the information gain out of FOT and NDS [7]. Under the
assumption that good performance in critical situations
will be reflected also in uncritical ones, Eckstein et al. [8]
extracted and gathered critical situations out of different
FOT and NDS. These represent a promising starting
point for use cases in virtual test domains. Based on an
evaluation metric for scenarios, Tatar et al. [9] vary the input
parameters of the applied test domain. The used algorithms
perform searches for not yet tested scenarios or worst cases.
A similar statistical approach is given by Schuldt et al [4].
The core idea is the reduction of use cases by excluding
redundant combinations of parameters. A feasible number of
use cases is not the only way to enable a better assessment
of ADAS, also the continuous improvement of virtual test
domains is an important factor. Besides SIL featuring a
heavy parallelization and faster than real time simulations,
VIL possess a lot of potential [10]. Especially the ability
to simulate consciously critical situations without any risk
of human health or material damage represents a unique
advantage.
Another important issue besides the assessment of ADAS
is their influence on traffic safety. It is determined by
post-priori evaluations [11], meaning the comparision of
the traffic safety before and after the launch of ADAS.
Unfortunately, a post-priori evaluation for traffic safety
relies on several critical aspects [12]. First of all, statistical
analysis on accident databases cannot be used exclusivley
as a large amount of samples and observation time is
required [13]. Secondly, the samples have to provide
detailed information concerning vehicle types, technical
equipment, functional specifications, and driver interaction.
In addition, an underlying evaluation metric has to be
chosen for estimating the accident severity of each sample
[14]. Beyond these problematics, the complete process
needs an unacceptable long feedback loop for optimizing
traffic safety [15]. Nevertheless, there is up to now no other
promising approach to include traffic safety issues already
during the development process.
B. Validity of Future Assessment Methods for HAD
The major difference between HAD and ADAS rely on
an increased amount of traffic scenarios being mastered
combined with different environments. In general a real
traffic scenario can be described only up to a certain
degree of accuracy using parameters. In reality it is simply
not possible to observe and gather all details, while in a
simulation the accessible parameters are defined by the
framework [16]. Taking all parameters which are required
for a sufficient representation into account leads to a
high-dimensional test space. Its coverage is a sophistacted
task, even for simulation. This test space cannot be divided
uniformly into grids as parameters are correlated with each
other, which causes varying relevant distances between grid
points. A sufficient grid-distance for a certain parameter
depends on its correlation with the remaining parameters.
Especially for continuous parameters the distance may vary
in arbitrary small steps. Also a take-over process has to
be taken into account for some use cases [17], [18]. A
complete list of all use cases to be considered is simply not
realizable or results in a not economically affordable task to
be performed in a FOT. In addition, the assessment has to
be repeated for each relevant derivative of the vehicle [19]
or future release of the HAD function.
Of course not every combination of parameters in the test
space is of the same interest for the assessment. Situations
appearing statistically less often in real traffic are also
less likely to be performed during a FOT. Included in this
category are particularly accidents or critical situations,
whose coverage in the test space are indispensable for the
traffic safety. Under the average occurrence of an accident
Winner et al. [20] estimates that the required test volume
to cover the test space is at least exceeding 108 testing
kilometers. Regardless of knowing the exact numbers for
the test volume, it is out of question that the required
test miles exceed by far the capability of FOT and NDS.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that all existing types of
relevant use cases are discovered. An intelligent choice of
the test volume has to be a central topic for the assessment
of HAD. A few test miles including not yet considered
use cases will give a more valuable feedback for the HAD
function than thousands of already well understood ones.
Another approach is based on safety by design. Mitsch et
al. [21] derived a collision-free algorithm for autonomous
robotic ground vehicles, only limited by the simplification
of the environment. Thus, the assessment has not only to
test the safety of a complex system but already influence
the design of the system.
Taking the revealed issues into account and following
the argumentation of Wachenfeld et al. [5] and Mazzega
et al. [22], a valid assessment method for HAD has to
satisfy several aspects. First, the test concept has to be
representative in a sense that it can generate and display
use cases including street and environment conditions. The
degree of simplification in testing a use case must not depart
appreciably from its real behavior. Second, the use cases have
to be repeatable and therefore the parameters to describe
a use case have to be observable. The same requirements
are given for the criteria to evaluate a use case. Third, the
test concept has to be economically acceptable by means of
being feasible. These statements are also aligned with the
goals of PEGASUS, a joint project promoted by the Federal
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy [23]. The two
central questions being addressed by PEGASUS are related
to the minimum performance that the automated vehicles
need to achieve and how this performance can be measured
[24].
Although the requirements and the goals for the HAD
assessment are clearly determined, the progress towards the
realization remains ambiguous. A promising role in this
process play the different test domains and their capability
to replace FOT or NDS for selected cases. However, for a
successful cross-validation of the scenario space by different
test domains two decisive questions are still unanswered and
we are going to focus our research effort on them in the rest
of the paper.
• How can we describe the test space to be representative
for all test domains?
• How can we derive a common basis to evaluate test
domains?
III. SCENARIO-BASED ASSESSMENT FOR HAD
A. Describing a Scenario for a HAD Function
In the previous section we used terms like situation,
scene, scenario and use case more or less equivalently. In
the following we have to be more precise and distinguish
these nomenclatures concerning time span and content.
Ulbrich et al. [16] gave a reasonable definition for all four
terms. A scene and a situation describe the traffic in form
of a snapshot without a time scale. A scene contains all
neutral information of the traffic or the environment and the
self-representation of all participants. The situation differs
from the scene by including only the information which
is relevant for selecting a certain behavior. In contrast,
a scenario consists of a sequence of scenes representing
a temporal dependency. A use case wraps a scenario by
adding requirements for testing.
Following these definitions, three scenes of a possible
scenario in real traffic are pictured in Fig. 1. The scenario
itself represents a cut-in (a) of another traffic object (TO),
followed by a braking action of the TO in front of the EGO
(b) and the decision to overtake the TO (c). If the decision
to overtake the TO results in a correct system behavior or
not is subject to a subsequent evaluation of the scenario.
The scenario description itself includes no rating but simply
spans a certain time of traffic involving the EGO vehicle
driven by a HAD function. The important question for this
section is how can the measured scenario be transferred into
another test domain, be re-simulated or be applied to different
versions of HAD functions. Thus, the scenario has to be
broken down to a description language. We categorized the
parameters defining the description language into three parts.
• The environment part contains weather conditions for
example position of the sun, date, backlight, humidity
or wind strength.
• In the static part we describe the parameters of the
road like number of lanes, curve bending or line type.
Additionally, non-moving objects, trees or crash barriers
are listed.
• The dynamic part stores the features of all traffic
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Fig. 1. The figures describe a scenario including a HAD function and
its re-simulation in a SIL test domain. The sub-figures (a)-(c) show scenes
referring to the scenario recorded in real traffic. It presents a cut-in of a TO
visible on the left of the EGO in (a) followed by a braking of the TO in (b).
As a result the HAD function decides to overtake the TO in (c). In the sub-
figures (d)-(f) the corresponding re-simulated scenes are visualized by the
ROS library rviz [25], only based on vehicle and not ground truth data. The
trajectory of the TO for re-simulation is defined in the scenario description
by a spline interpolation for velocity and heading illustrated in (g)-(i). In (h)
and (i) the process for constructing the splines out of original measured data
points is pictured. The cubic parameters for each spline section indicated
by dots are optimized to yield after integration a trajectory close to the real
one shown in (g). As a loss function the mean square error regarding each
measured trajectory point was applied.
Concerning the EGO, the description contains only the
necessary information to establish an unambiguous initial-
ization at the beginning of the scenario. For all remaining
TOs it contains a fixed defined behavior during the scenario.
Triggers or events for changing the behavior of TOs are
excluded as the resulting traffic of the scenario would be
ambiguous for different HAD functions. Another decisive
issue is that the scenario description contains no values in
form of parameters given to a certain test domain or the HAD
function itself. These parameters are of cause influencing the
outcome of the scenario and are necessary for re-performing
the scenario description in the applied test domain to generate
the same outcome, but are not part of the description. The
same holds for restrictions or desired goals given to a HAD
function. They influence the behavior of a HAD function,
thus influencing the outcome of a scenario, but again do not
belong to the scenario description itself.
To complete the example from Fig. 1 the results of a
SIL test domain for the corresponding scenes are shown in
(d)-(f). The re-simulated trajectories of the TOs are obtained
on a cubic spline interpolation for the velocity and heading
optimized by the mean square error for each time step
on the measured trajectory. An example for the optimized
splines for the cut-in TO is shown in (g)-(i). The parameters
for heading and velocity splines of each TO are afterwards
listed in the scenario description relative to the underlying
roadmap provided in the static part. This information is
sufficient to derive the complete trajectory and higher order
derivatives up to second order of the overtaking TO. Also
the start position, start heading and start velocity of the
EGO are notated in the description file. In contrast, relevant
parameters in order to launch the HAD function are part of
the simulation and have to be stored outside the description
or as additional information in its header. In addition, it
is the task of the SIL test domain to achieve the initial
conditions for the first scene of the scenario for the ego as
well as for all TOs. This includes for our SIL framework
a short relaxation time before the start of a scenario in
order to load all TO in the simulation and to give the HAD
function enough time to recognize them and determine its
driving strategy. The sum of all initial conditions for the
scenario can be seen as a trigger condition for the test
domain to start the scenario. Thus, the test domain is in
charge to insure the correct initial conditions and again any
parameter required for this relaxation phase can be saved
for re-simulation issues in the description header but does
not belong to the scenario description.
Historically, there are already approaches to provide
similar scenario descriptions for simulation frameworks
[26], but mainly the description mixes between the relevant
parameters for the scenario and logical statements or simply
includes values and goals of the HAD function to the
description. An approach for a description which gets close
to the requirements is OpenSCENARIO [27]. Up to date it
is in implementation and not fully stable yet.
A critical point of a scenario description that is not
addressed so far is the required degree of accuracy for
representing reality. As mentioned before, reality is char-
acterized by an arbitrary number of details, impossible to
be converted into parameters without a loss of accuracy.
This problem occurs in each virtual test domain for any
component of a HAD function which is simulated. Referring
to our example of using a spline interpolation to describe
the trajectories of TOs measured in real traffic, the limit of
accuracy is given by the mean square error concerning the
trajectories in the optimization step. To verify whether this
accuracy is sufficient to describe the scenario or not will
be solved by design of the evaluation process in the next
section. Besides this accuracy issue, we generally suggest to
limit entries in the scenario description by the perceiving
and interpreting feasibility of the vehicle sensors or the
requirements of the driving strategy within a HAD function.
If up to date technology is not able to provide certain aspects
of a HAD function or a HAD function neglects those aspects
in the driving strategy, it is not meaningful to list them
in the scenario description. Summarizing this section, the
construction of a scenario description according to the given
requirements leads to a scenario-based representation of the
test space valid for all test domains and a certain degree of
accuracy.
B. Evaluating a Scenario
After establishing the description of a scenario and thus
the presentation of a scenario-based test space, the ques-
tion for an evaluation of the HAD function in a chosen
scenario arises. At that point it is important to understand
that not every test domain can assess the complete HAD
function. Fig. 2 gives an overview of a simplified HAD
architecture and the components of a HAD function which
can be accessed by the most common test domains. The real
test domains FOT and NDS of course cover the complete
architecture - sensors, environment model, driving strategy
and vehicle control. VIL cannot assess the sensors as it relies
on already predefined object lists as well as simulated GPS
coordinates. Therefore, parts of the environment model like
sensor fusion or localization on the roadmap are also not
possible to assess whereas the situation interpretation for
example already is. In addition, all further components of the
driving strategy and the vehicle control are testable without
exception. Similar to VIL, SIL is able to access nothing else
than the situation interpretation in the environment model
and the complete driving strategy. In contrast, the vehicle
controls are just partially testable by SIL as the correctness
of sending signals can be verified, but not the resulting
dynamics. HIL is very valuable as it can in principle test
each component or compound of components but it is not
feasible to chain too many, in reality.
Fig. 2. Simplified architecture of a HAD function. The test domains SIL,
HIL, VIL, FOT and NDS are assigned by bars to the fields of components
they are able to assess [28].
Following Fig. 2 virtual test domains should be theoreti-
cally able to assess certain components of a HAD function.
Unfortunately, to close the loop for the assessment process
the remaining components which are not accessible in the
virtual test domain were replaced by models or approxima-
tions. Of cause, there is no guarantee that production ready
hardware and software combined with simulated components
yield the same results in a single scenario as the complete
real loop in FOT or NDS. To make such a comparison we
have already established a common basis via the description
language but we need also to define scenario-based quan-
tities. In the following we will call this set of quantities
calculated from the outcome of a scenario objectifications.
In general we distinguish three types of objectification.
• Functional objectifications cover values or technical
aspects of the operating HAD function, like sensors
availability or GPS signal intensity.
• Quantitative objectifications reflect the behavior of the
HAD function, like time to collision (TTC) or specific
distances to other objects. Also feelings like conve-
nience are included if an accurate objectification on the
given data exists.
• Legal objectifications based on legal requirements, like
speed limit restrictions or recognition of traffic signs.
An objectification itself includes no rating but simply
contains a value for a quantity. The evaluation of a single
scenario itself is established by criteria. A single criterion
represents a requirement for the performing HAD function
in the scenario and takes one or more objectifications to
return a key performance index (KPI). The set of all KPIs
in a scenario defines a measure for the risk or in other
words the performance of the HAD function in the scenario.
Moreover, KPIs make scenarios recorded in different test
domains comparable to each other as in sum they express
all requirements on a HAD function and thus characterize
the scenario sufficiently. In sum, a scenario recorded in
FOT or NDS and the same scenario re-simulated by the
appropriate scenario description in another test domain
will be compared not based on objectifications but on the
KPIs of the criteria. The design of a KPI-based comparison
also solves the remaining approximation problematic in the
scenario description of the last section.
To illustrate this important fact, assuming without loss of
generality the scenario and its description from Fig. 1, some
objectifications like the TTC values at each time step t and
a single criterion C being the requirement: The TTC value in
respect to TO should not undercut a certain threshold k for
any t during the scenario. In formulas the objectifications in
respect to t are given in equation (1) with d for the distance





Given the formulation of C, its possible KPIs are binary
- true if all TTC values are greater than the threshold or
otherwise false. A suitable representation of this statement





t Θ(t) = 0
false,
∑
t Θ(t) ≥ 1
Θ(t) := Θ(k − TTC(t)) =
{
0, TTC(t) ≥ k
1, TTC(t) < k
(2)
The decision whether a certain virtual test domain can
replace FOT in the example scenario is made by comparing
the KPIs of the criteria for the real scenario and the
simulated one. In this small example only the KPI of C is
required. If it is identical the approximation for the scenario
description as well as the applied models in the virtual test
domain are sufficient to access this single scenario based on
the criterion C. It is important to notice that only equality
of the KPIs is required, the actual values of the KPIs like
true or false reflect the performance of the HAD function.
The limitations of a virtual test domain concerning the
components of a HAD function in Fig. 2 are still valid.
Furthermore, if the KPIs differ, either the models in the
virtual test domain or the description language or even both
are not precise enough to assess the chosen scenario and a
cross-validation is not possible.
C. Cross-validation of Test Domains
We settled in the last two sections our two research
questions from the introduction, by defining a scenario
description language and combining it with an evaluation
which enables the comparison of test domains for a single
scenario. Up to this point no advantage regarding the
minimization of the scenario space or computation time
efficiency is generated, because to yield this replacement
statement we had to perform and evaluate the scenario in
both test domains. However, the information that a certain
scenario can be cross-validated leads to the assumption
that this statement is also true for similar scenarios in
the test space. The idea for the resulting progress is
pictured in Fig. 3. A data lake contains the scenario data
Fig. 3. Architecture for storing scenarios, scenario descriptions and
corresponding KPIs. Scenario descriptions can be extracted and re-simulated
in another test domain like SIL, representing the possibility of cross-
validating. Also the simulation of varied scenario descriptions is possible.
measured in FOT or NDS. This data is cut in time series
representing scenarios and stored in a database. Afterwards
the KPIs for each scenario are derived and linked to the
corresponding scenario description. Similarly, each scenario
description is extracted, linked to the original FOT data and
re-simulated in another virtual test domain, like SIL. The
simulated scenarios run through the same process in the
database besides that the scenario description generation
can be skipped as it will be identical to one used before.
If a scenario in FOT and a virtual test domain can be
cross-validated because of sharing the same KPI set, slightly
varied scenarios based on the parameters in the scenario
description are also simulated. The goal is to find parameters
which will scale continuously in terms of the resulting
KPIs. For these parameters a simple check with a real test
domain can ensure that the direction of variation still yields
similar KPIs and thus legitimizes the cross-validation for all
scenarios with parameter values in between the original and
the varied one. In contrast, if the check fails we cannot trust
any of the scenarios including parameters in the variation
range. The origin of this behavior lies as already mentioned
in the correlation to other parameters. We do not know the
exact impact of small variations of parameters on the KPIs.
Promising candidates are mainly parameters representing the
dynamics of TOs as these are bound to physical limitations
and their predictions are already part of the driving strategy.
Parameters in the environment or static part of the scenario
description tend to show no smooth behavior on the KPIs.
One example for this is the variation of a junction angle in
arbitrary small steps. Assuming at some point the junction is
not visible anymore. This fact will cause a decisive change
on the driving strategy of the HAD function and most likely
in complete different KPIs as in the last variation step.
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We demonstrated that a scenario description in
combination with KPIs enables the cross-validation of
a scenario by several test domains. Taking the nature of the
description format into account, let us assume that dynamic
parameters are sufficiently continuous. Combining these
two facts lead to a scenario-based test space for dynamic
parameters in which FOT or NDS can be locally exchanged
by virtual test domains.
Our recent research focuses on the partial online
deployment of the assessment method for improving traffic
safety. Theoretically, the assessment method is limited by
the computational time for the numbers of variations on the
scenario description file, the subsequent simulation for each
generated scenario description and its evaluation. Obviously,
increasing the number of variations will also increase the
quality of prediction. Unfortunately, the last two parts are
particularly time and hardware intensive, including multiple
simulation runs and evaluations on a huge amount of data.
For that reason we follow the deep learning based approach
of training neural networks on predicting the performance
assessment of a scenario. Scenario description and KPIs
act as training sample. In contrast to virtual test domains,
neural networks process scenario descriptions without
any simulation or the generation of data. Based on their
computational efficiency, trained networks will not only
significantly contribute to the on-board assessment. Also
pre-screening for further exploration of the scenario space
and detection of hot spots are possible areas of application,
enabling a precise deployment of more time critical test
domains.
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